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The dream as prediction seems inherently improbable. The bizarre occurrences in
dreams never characterize everyday life. Dreams do not come true! But assuming
that bizarreness negates expectations may rest on a misunderstanding of how the
predictive brain works. In evolutionary terms, the ability to rapidly predict what sensory
input implies—through expectations derived from discerning patterns in associated past
experiences—would have enhanced fitness and survival. For example, food and water
are essential for survival, associating past experiences (to identify location patterns)
predicts where they can be found. Similarly, prediction may enable predator identification
from what would have been only a fleeting and ambiguous stimulus—without prior
expectations. To confront the many challenges associated with natural settings, visual
perception is vital for humans (and most mammals) and often responses must be rapid.
Predictive coding during wake may, therefore, be based on unconscious imagery so
that visual perception is maintained and appropriate motor actions triggered quickly.
Speed may also dictate the form of the imagery. Bizarreness, during REM dreaming,
may result from a prospective code fusing phenomena with the same meaning—within a
particular context. For example, if the context is possible predation, from the perspective
of the prey two different predators can both mean the same (i.e., immediate danger) and
require the same response (e.g., flight). Prospective coding may also prune redundancy
from memories, to focus the image on the contextually-relevant elements only, thus,
rendering the non-relevant phenomena indeterminate—another aspect of bizarreness.
In sum, this paper offers an evolutionary take on REM dreaming as a form of prospective
coding which identifies a probabilistic pattern in past events. This pattern is portrayed in
an unconscious, associative, sensorimotor image which may support cognition in wake
through being mobilized as a predictive code. A particular dream illustrates.
Keywords: prediction, prospective coding, REM dreaming, pattern, unconscious
INTRODUCTION
There is a long standing idea that, based on prior experience, the brain generates predictions (or
expectations) to interpret and, thereby, identify sensory input (Helmholtz, 1909; Gregory, 1980).
Equally, the notion that expectations link perception and action is an old one (James, 1890). These
revived ideas have excited current interest in the predictive brain across multiple areas (Bubic
et al., 2010). Specifically, in the brain as a “Bayesian inference machine” (Knill and Pouget, 2004;
Yuille and Kersten, 2006; Friston, 2010), in bi-directional “hierarchical generative models” (Dayan
et al., 1995; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2012; Clark, 2013), and in predictive (Friston, 2005;
Llewellyn Dream to Predict?
Friston and Kiebel, 2009) and prospective coding (Rainer et al.,
1999; Ferbinteanu and Shapiro, 2003; Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz,
2007). Against this background, Yordanova et al. (2012) call for a
major research focus on the predictive brain during altered states
of consciousness, suggesting REM sleep may be of particular
consequence.
This paper focuses on the form coding may take,
hypothesizing that, a REM dream constitutes a form of
prospective image-based code which identifies an associative
pattern in past events and, therefore, portrays associations
between past experiences (rather than the experiences as such).
This image-based code may be retained at an unconscious level
and mobilized to predict the immediate sensory environment
and interpret the causes of sensory input during wake.
In relation to this hypothesis, two points are worthy of note.
First, there is agreement with Stickgold (2002) who argues that,
in the absence of sensory input, reactivated memories must be
the source material for dreams. Albeit this paper hypothesizes
that REM dreams portray only those elements of reactivated
memories which identify an associative pattern in past events.
Second, Horne (2013) presents evidence that REM sleep prepares
for wake, here this proposal is extended to REM dreams also- in
the sense that REMdreams are argued to create prospective codes
which impact on perception and action in subsequent waking
states.
Patterns, Predictions, and Unconscious
Inference
In evolutionary terms, any animal which can move must predict
where food, predators, and mates can be found (Schultz et al.,
1997). Prediction can preclude possible futures and, thus, would
have enhanced fitness and survival (Gilbert and Wilson, 2011).
For example, if memory of a predator sighting interprets
sensory input as indicative of a predator, the animal can take
avoiding action and preclude being killed on this occasion. This
perspective on memory as inherent to sense-making extends
to an enactivist ontology, where the world, as experienced, is
sculpted by expectations which project meaning and propel
willed actions (Varela et al., 1991; Di Paolo, 2009).
Predictions, on the basis of memories of past events, are only
possible if events are patterned in some way (Panichello et al.,
2012). Memory is fundamentally associative in both structure
and process (Fuster, 1997, 1999). Associative structure and
process may have evolved to embed patterns in memory. In
turn, associative activation of memories generates the patterns
which form predictions (Bar, 2007, 2011; Aminoff et al., 2008;
Buckner, 2010). Patternsmay be deterministic, generated by fixed
regularities, co-occurrences or associations. For example, night
with associated dark follows and is associated with day, with
its associated light. On the other hand, the patterns generated
by the behavior of living beings will be probabilistic, based
on regularities or associations which have a tendency to co-
occur (see later discussion). Probabilistic patternsmay be difficult
to discern because they are based on memories of infrequent,
complex or non-obvious co-occurrences or associations.
Animals are thought able to discern patterns in events
because they are capable of inference (Tolman, 1948; Pfeiffer
and Foster, 2013), through using configural, as opposed to
elemental, associations (Honey et al., 2014) and can link
common elements across different experiences (Wood et al.,
1999; Hampson et al., 2004) to discern patterns in events.
Humans too associate common experiential elements in a
combined representation (Zeithamova and Preston, 2010),
such integrated representations portray memory elements in
“prospectively useful formats” (Zeithamova et al., 2012).Animals
lack sophisticated language skills, however. Both animals and
early humans would have “thought” non-verbally through
images (Baumeister and Masicampo, 2010). The primary
function of mental imagery may be to generate predications
(Moulton and Kosslyn, 2009). An image-based code may
portray the associations which reflect experiential patterns. These
associations drive expectations for sensory input during wake.
Clearly, at any point in time in wake, the sensorium is infinite
and, in consequence, must be sampled. Image-based predictions
may drive “active sampling of sensory data” to identify its
expected causes (Friston et al., 2012). Expectations about causes
can only be on the basis of inferring a causal pattern in the world.
Helmholtz (1909) proposed that unconscious inference
is the foundation for perception. For humans and most
other mammals, maintaining visual perception is crucial.
Unconscious image-based predictions would not interfere with
visual perception. They would also facilitate rapid action and be
particularly relevant in situations of threat and potential danger.
Dangers require fast processing and rapid action (Öhman et al.,
2000; Carretié et al., 2005). In evolutionary terms, early humans
had to visit particular places (associated with survival). Such
landmark places held rewards but also dangers. For example, a
waterhole where “sit and wait” predators, like lions, may seek
to ambush prey in the surrounding vegetative cover (Hopcraft
et al., 2005). On approach to a waterhole, unconscious image-
based predictions, based on prior predator sightings, may drive
active sampling of color and movement in the vegetative cover-
if a predator was judged to be a plausible explanation for
sensory input. Visual perception has been found to be predictive
and probabilistic rather than passive, incoming visual input
is interpreted and fine-tuned unconsciously with reference to
memories, including memories of prior beliefs (Kersten et al.,
2004; Knill and Pouget, 2004).
Congruent with the idea that expectations link perception
and action, an unconscious image-based code may also portray
memories of action appropriate to the circumstances. The
activation of mnemonic images enables unconscious bodily
responses which reflect the situation i.e., mnemonic images are
fundamentally efferent processes, the image is essential for the
motor actions, for review, see Cuthbert et al. (1991). Indeed,
motor directives can be integrated into sensory perceptions
to facilitate rapid action, for review see Bubic et al. (2010).
Predictive coding enables the motor system to “select appropriate
responses” before an anticipated event is realized (Schütz-
Bosbach and Prinz, 2007).
Prospective Coding and Predictive Coding
Bubic et al. (2010) comment that the terms “predictive” and
“prospective” are not consistently used in the same way but, on
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the other hand, are not always clearly differentiated, a situation
that can lead to confusion, they suggest that “predictive coding”
is taken to mean that, during the wake state the brain anticipates
upcoming sensory inputs and actively samples external stimuli to
identify their causes, rather than registering stimuli in a passive
manner. In this article predictive coding in wake is hypothesized
to rely upon unconscious, internally generated prospective codes.
Prospective coding is understood here as the off-line creation
of prospective codes which are oriented toward the future and
can be mobilized as predictive codes to interpret the immediate
environment during wake.
A key aspect of prospective codes is that because they portray
associative visual patterns between prior events (rather than
the events per se), therefore, they engender representations
that are quintessentially fictive or counterfactual. In this sense,
this paper equates prospective coding with the encoding of
counterfactual representations which can inform in the future,
which is one step further than classical predictive coding theory
(that only furnishes predictions of the current outcome given
their hypothetical causes).
REM dreaming is argued to be conducive to prospective
coding. Such coding may require the core characteristics which
REM dreaming shares with the wake state: active consciousness
during which a world appears with (almost always) an embodied,
agential self at its center (Llinás, 2002; Metzinger, 2009).
REM SLEEP AND DREAMING AS
PROSPECTIVE CODING
During off-line states, people contemplate the past to anticipate
the future (Bar, 2007, 2011; Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007).
Sleep is clearly off-line. As a whole, sleep preferentially reactivates
memories associated with future rewards (Fischer and Born,
2009) and memories expected to be relevant to future behavior
(Wilhelm et al., 2011). Hobson et al. (2014) argue the virtual
realities engendered in REM dreams refine predictions. A
REM dream image may be the result of prospective coding
which refines predictions through hyperassociating elements of
different past events during the identification of a personally
significant pattern which arises from these elements of past
events.
Dreaming hyperassociates different memories (Hobson, 2002;
Llewellyn, 2013; Horton and Malinowski, 2015; Malinowski and
Horton, 2015). Whole memories are hardly ever replayed in
dreams (Fosse et al., 2003; Malinowski and Horton, 2014),
rather elements of experiential memories are associated in visual
scenes (Hobson, 1988; Hartmann, 1996; Walker and Stickgold,
2010). Memory trace reactivation in REM was associated
with the extraction of patterns in higher order information
(Peigneux et al., 2003). Using fMRI, Chow et al. (2013) found
brain connectivity during REM to be consistent with the
extraction of patterns from past events. REM sleep selectively
processes personally-significant material (van Rijn et al., 2015).
The extraction of any personally meaningful pattern in past
experiences would enable expectations about future, personally
significant, events.
Personally significant, past and future events will be
emotionally charged. Indeed, anticipatory affect may be an
integral aspect of prediction (Barrett and Bar, 2009; Anderson
et al., 2011). Emotional memory is enhanced in REM sleep
(Cahill and McGaugh, 1998; Wagner et al., 2001; Nishida et
al., 2009) and heightened emotional tone strengthens memory
associations (Cahill et al., 1996; Hamann et al., 1999). REM sleep
may preferentially reactivate emotionally significant memories
(Sterpenich et al., 2007, 2009). About 75–95% of dreams depict
emotional events, such dreams are largely during REM sleep
(Hobson et al., 1998, 2000). REM dreams are characterized by
fear and anxiety (Smith et al., 2004). Sleep deprivation (whole
night) leads to preferential retention of negative (rather than
positive) memories (Walker and Stickgold, 2006; Sterpenich
et al., 2007; Yoo et al., 2007; Walker, 2008) and REM
sleep even counteracts the suppression of unwanted memories
(Fischer et al., 2011). The preferential retention of negative,
rather than positive memories, after sleep deprivation, may
have an evolutionary explanation. Animals face many survival
challenges in natural environments, early humans, too, would
have experienced such testing conditions. An ability to predict
threats to survival would have been adaptive, therefore, evolution
may have prioritized negative over positive memories—under
conditions of sleep deprivation.
Evolutionary explanations for REM sleep functions have
been suggested. Evolutionarily ancient brain networks are
preferentially engaged in REM sleep, for review see (Doricchi
et al., 2007). In humans and most mammals, brain processes in
REM indicate behaviors such as exploration, foraging, eating, and
spatial navigation and the ability to deal with fear and anxiety,
suggesting that REM serves ecological purposes and had an
evolutionary imperative (Horne, 2013, 2015).
As noted earlier, in evolutionary terms, the rewards of food or
water were often only obtained under situations of risk because
places, such as waterholes and dependable food sites, where many
species congregated, both provoked competitive interactions and
also attracted predators. In such circumstances, simple predator
and competitor avoidance was not possible. To obtain food and
water the animal would have been exposed to risk. Predicting the
patterns of behavior of both competitors and predators would
have reduced risk and increased the chances of securing the
rewards.
Rewards, dangers and competitive interactions were emotive
and of high personal significance. Wallas (1926) identified an
evolutionary imperative to recognize “resemblance in difference”
i.e., “hidden” or non-obvious likenesses between, for example,
different kinds of scraps which are all associated because they
are all food and animals from different species which are
all associated because they are all competitors or predators.
Likenesses, whether obvious or non-obvious, constitute patterns
in events, so do place-object associations. With regard to
predators, it is not only necessary to predict “Is this a predator”—
to identify it from what may be ambiguous sensory input but also
to predict “How does the predator behave” and “Where and when
can it be found”—to take appropriate action to avoid it.
Predator sightings (the object) in, for example, three out
of ten approaches to a waterhole (the place) would have been
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a personally significant pattern which could give rise to a
probabilistic prediction. Even if the pattern of sightings of a
predator was regular, for example on the third, sixth and ninth
visits, predictions about the behavior of this predator, would still
be probabilistic because patterned behavior can always vary. A
pattern of predator sightings on three out of ten approaches to
a waterhole may be driven by another non-obvious, meaningful
association. For example, the predator only visits this waterhole
when it anticipates that prey will be abundant. In such a
circumstance, identifying an association between “waterhole” and
“abundance of prey” and “presence of a predator” would enhance
survival because the animal could visit at less populous times.
As mentioned earlier, unconscious predictions are particularly
relevant in situations of potential danger.
However, unconscious predictions are also important
whenever speed is crucial for success. For example, identifying
a probabilistic pattern in the presence of mates at a landmark
place would enhance reproduction and speed would be necessary
to secure a mate against competitors. Unconscious learning of
probabilistic patterns to predict future events benefits from sleep
(Djonlagic et al., 2009) and is REM sleep dependent (Barsky
et al., 2015).
Several studies indicate that REM sleep enables the
identification of meaningful patterns. Walker et al. (2002)
found a 32% increase in the number of anagrams solved after
REM awakenings, as compared to non-REM (NREM). There
is also evidence that the patterns identified in REM may be
“loose” or non-obvious. For example, when awakened from REM
sleep, subjects demonstrated more priming in response to looser,
non-obvious primes (e.g., thief-wrong) as compared to stronger,
obvious primes (e.g., hot-cold), whereas after NREM awakenings
subjects showed more responsiveness to the stronger, obvious
primes (Stickgold et al., 1999). REM, as compared to quiet rest
in wake and NREM sleep, increased subjects’ abilities to think of
a word linked with three test words that seemed unrelated, for
example, “surprise,” “line,” and “birthday” do not seem associated
but “party” is connected with all three (Cai et al., 2009). Looking
for non-obvious patterns in past events involves making creative
(i.e., non-obvious or loose) associations between experiences.
Sterpenich et al. (2014) found that reactivating memories during
REM sleep engendered new creative associations amongst them.
Cognitive control and tight, analytic reasoning depend
upon the prefrontal cortex (Nathaniel-James and Frith, 2002;
Goel and Dolan, 2004; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Reverberi
et al., 2005a), which is deactivated during REM sleep (Maquet
et al., 1996; Braun et al., 1997; Maquet, 2000). For a non-
obvious insight task, 82% of patients with focal damage to
the frontal lateral cortex solved the task whereas only 43% of
healthy participants did so (Reverberi et al., 2005b), indicating
that prefrontal areas actually impede non-obvious associative
insights—possibly through exercising cognitive control which
biases toward more obvious associations. Similarly, Limb and
Braun (2008) argued that de-activation of the frontal cortex
may generate “spontaneous unplanned associations,” see also (Liu
et al., 2012).
Association between memories is driven by inferring
their meaning. Experiences (or things) are associated in the
mind/brain when their meaning is the same or similar. For
humans, meanings may be culturally shared (Bruner, 1990)
but meaning is often personally specific i.e., what does this
mean to me. Carruthers and Ziolkowski (2002) point out that
associational meaning, is often individualized rather than
universal, dependent on one’s prior experiences, and personal
needs, desires and goals. For example, “hospital” may be most
meaningfully associated to “eye” to me but “recovery” to another
or even “career” to some. Meaning can also imply concrete
significance for needs, desires or goals (Clore and Ortony, 2000)
i.e., what does this mean for me?
Such personal meanings may have evolved from the relational
“affordances” which link animals and their environment
(Chemero, 2003). From a relational view, environmental
affordances only become resources if there are animals to take
advantage of them, for example, fruit only means food for
fruit eating animals, see Turvey (1992). To exploit what the
environment affords for me it is sometimes necessary to avoid
threats, archetypically, from competitors and predators.
In a natural environment, a lion means “fundamental threat
for my goal of survival.” The presence of a competitor means
“rivalry for resources.” Memories of possible predator sightings
on approach to waterholes would have been associated because
they all meant and implied the same motor actions of rapid flight
or freezing. Equally, memories of competitors at dependable
food sites all meant potential struggle. Or memories of mating
at a particular place all meant satisfaction of instinctive drives.
In their entirety, memories of visits may have been completely
different but with respect to the element “predator sighting,”
“competitor present” or “mating opportunity,” respectively, they
were the same. In consequence, a prospective code, created in
REM dreaming, which identifies a pattern in “predator sightings,”
“competitors present,” or “mating opportunities” may discard
much that is already predictable about the visits to associate only
memory elements relevant to “predator sightings,” “competitors
present,” or “mating opportunities.”
As mentioned above, if a conscious image-based predictive
code was mobilized in wake it would interfere with visual
perception, and be detrimental in situations where rapid action is
essential. If any insights into patterns are acquired unconsciously
in wake before sleep, REM sleep stabilizes them at an unconscious
level (Yordanova et al., 2008). Implicit learning seems to be
especially sensitive to REM sleep deprivation (Smith, 1995; Plihal
and Born, 1997) and REM sleep benefits implicit visual memories
(Wagner et al., 2003).
Indeed, throughout evolutionary time, “vision for action” may
have relied on unconsciousmental imagery (Goodale andMilner,
1992, 2013; Milner and Goodale, 2008). Congruent with the
idea that the predictive brain links expectations with perception
and action (see above), the imagery during REM dreaming
is sensorimotor in nature and action-oriented (Hobson, 2002;
Llinás, 2002). As discussed above, REM dreaming is emotionally
charged, particularly with the primary emotions of elation, fear
and anxiety (Hobson, 1988, 2002). Such emotions may have
evolved from securing rewards in situations of risk. From an
evolutionary perspective, emotions are action depositions and
reflect two fundamental opposed action sets: approach, following
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positive evaluations and avoidance, after negative evaluations
(Lang et al., 1990; Lang, 1995; Elliot and Church, 1997; Carver
et al., 2000; Elliot, 2006). These evaluations of positive or
negative consequences can be unconscious (Chen and Bargh,
1999; Neumann et al., 2003; Bargh and Morsella, 2008).
Memory reactivations in post-training REM sleep optimize
visuo-motor responses (Laureys et al., 2001), suggesting that
REM dreaming may rehearse the motor actions necessary for
the approach or avoidance behaviors appropriate to the identified
pattern in events [c.f. the “dream as rehearsal” of motor programs
for instinctive, particularly threatening experiences in wake
(Jouvet, 1999; Revonsuo, 2000)]. Such processing may enable the
integration between expectation, perception and action which is
thought to characterize predictive coding in wake.
Visual Processing, REMs and Prospective
Coding
Certain visual processing abilities e.g., identifying embedded
figures and recognizing images in unfocussed pictures are
the best predictors of solving problems requiring insight
into patterns (Schooler and Melcher, 1995; Bowden et al.,
2005). In evolutionary terms, an ability to identify embedded
figures would, clearly, be required to distinguish any partially
camouflaged predators (Llewellyn and Hobson, 2015). Moreover,
the visual sense is the only modality which readily enables non-
obvious associations to be made, incorporated into a whole and
readily communicated (Paivio, 1990, 2013). Indeed, as noted
earlier, the prime function of mental imagery may be to make
predications. Ever since the Aserinsky and Kleitman (1953)
and Dement and Kleitman (1957) studies, human visual-like
processing of mental imagery in REM dreaming has been of
sustained interest.
During REM dreaming, Aserinsky and Kleitman (1953) first
drew attention to the eponymous REMs, but their exact function
is still unresolved. There has been an extended debate as to
whether REMs are functionally similar to saccades in wake and
relate to mental imagery in dreaming, for review, see (Miyauchi
et al., 2009). However recent work hasmade some progress on the
function of REMs. In goal-oriented dreams with motor behavior,
REMs were directed toward the dream events (Leclair-Visonneau
et al., 2010). Sprenger et al. (2010) found that when people
imagine vivid scenes during dreaming, their REMs are similar
to eye movements with open eyes when imagining remembered
scenes in wake. Although, research on REMs has tended to
dichotomise their function as either scanning (Leclair-Visonneau
et al., 2010) or generating visual (dream) imagery, other work
indicates that REMs do both (Hong et al., 2009). In the absence
of sensory input (as during REM dreaming), imagination is
required to generate a mental image (Conway, 2009; Nir and
Tononi, 2010). As discussed earlier, predicting the future relies
on the imaginative association of elements of past experiences
(Szpunar et al., 2007; Addis et al., 2009; Addis and Schacter, 2011)
to identify the patterns which enable predictions.
Friston et al. (2012) argue that saccades are directed visual
searches to generate sensory evidence for a hypothesis formed on
the basis of previous experience. For example, the hypothesis may
be that movement in the undergrowth surrounding the waterhole
is caused by a “sit and wait” predator. Similarly, REMs may be
directed visual-like searches of memories to generate evidence
for a prospective code which can be mobilized in the future
wake state as a predictive code or perceptual hypothesis. Such
a conclusion is congruent with Hong et al. (2009) who argue
that REMs both scan and generate dream imagery. It is also
compatible with Andrillon et al. (2015) who demonstrate that
saccades and REMs are both “reminiscent of visual-mnemonic
responses” and both occur at transitions in visual (or visual-like)
processing. Such transitions may, in REMs, trigger a new dream
image.
As noted by Friston et al. (2012) active sampling reflects
the self-organizing nature of the brain. The idea that
REMs both scan and generate dream imagery is also a self-
organizing principle. Self-organizing systems, like the brain,
are characterized by circular causality which is not tautologous
(Kelso, 1997; Freeman, 1999; Hardy, 2001; Keller, 2007). Much of
contemporary physiology and psychology still holds to the linear
cause and effect assumptions of “inputs and outputs, stimuli
and responses,” self-organizing poses a fundamental challenge to
these suppositions (Kelso, 1997) and speaks to the constructive
aspect of perception as exemplified, par excellence, in
dreaming.
REM Dream Bizarreness and Prospective
Coding
McCarley and Hoffman (1981) reported that 67% of REM
dreams exhibit bizarreness, i.e., incongruities, indeterminacy
or discontinuities, see below and discussion in Rittenhouse
et al. (1994). Bizarreness may be caused by the conflation of
memory elements (Cicogna and Bosinelli, 2001). As noted above,
prospective coding in REM dreaming may conflate memory
elements which have the same meaning for the dreamer. For
example, in my illustrative dream below I conflate failing
an eye test with a saggy, old, toy, cloth cat because, to
me, they both mean visual field restriction. This conflation
engenders a bizarre dream image. The term “bizarre” describes
a place, person or object which assumes multiple (seemingly
inconsistent) elements. However, judgements about bizarreness
(or inconsistency) in dreams are made from the wake state.
As discussed above, Stickgold et al. (1999) found changes in
associative memory systems across wake, NREM and REM
where the normal pattern of priming (more response to strong
primes) was demonstrated in wake and on awakening from
NREM sleep whereas there was more response to non-obvious
or “looser” primes on awakening from REM sleep. This research
implies that the mind in wake may not easily identify the
“looser,” non-obvious associations made in REM dreaming,
giving rise to judgements that the associations made in dreams
are “bizarre.” Whereas it may be that REM meaning-based
associations are more creative because they are non-obvious but,
at least potentially, discernible in the wake state. Edwards et al.
(2013) found that dream analysis gave rise to “Aha!” insights in
relation to both the associative nature of the dream content and
its memory source. Indeed, the very use of the term “prospective
coding” implies opacity but also the possibility of discerning the
code.
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Rittenhouse et al. (1994) argue that bizarreness in dreams
operates under constraints which limit it to incongruities
(inconsistent or fused features of people, objects, or places),
indeterminacy (where the identity of a person, object or place
remains explicitly vague) and discontinuities (sudden changes
in these features of people, objects or places). As argued above,
the inconsistency may be apparent, arising from the propensity
of the mind in wake to be more attuned to obvious, rather than
non-obvious, more creative, associations.
Hobson and Friston (2012) suggest that sleep reduces model
complexity and prunes redundancy to optimize predictive
coding during wake (in formal statistical terms complexity
minimization is known as Occam’s principle), see also Hobson
et al. (2014). During REM dreaming, a reduction in prospective
coding complexity may be achieved, in part, through fusion
of memory elements with the same meaning for the dreamer,
which elicit similar emotions in the dreamer and may require
the same motor responses—if used as a predictive code in wake.
Similarly, pruning of redundancy during sleep may be achieved
through rendering the identity of people, objects, or places
vague—where their explicit details are not required to generate
an effective image-based prospective code. Indeed, including
such non-relevant details would distract from the essential
“message” of the code for new situations. Indeed, eliminating
redundant aspects of internal models ensures generalization to
new circumstances. A good internal model only captures the
essentials of what is important for (my) inferences about the
world.
Both of these aspects of pruning redundancy (fusion and
vagueness) enable abstraction or generalization-as noted by
Hobson et al. (2014). Pruning redundancy can be conceptualized
as de-contextualization which, as noted by Horton and
Malinowski (2015), also enables generalization through stripping
away the original context. For example, although a lion and
a hyena are different they both belong to the more abstract
category of “predators.” They also both inspire fear and require
the same motor response of freeze or flight. Fusing a lion
and a hyena in a “liena” associative image would generalize a
prospective code to more than one predator. Similarly if both
a lion and a hyena had been sighted on separate occasions on
approach to a waterhole, memories of these associated waterhole
events may be rendered vague in a prospective code- excepting
for the relevant predator focus.
The scene discontinuities which Rittenhouse et al.
(1994) identify as bizarre may, in a similar manner to the
inconsistencies, reflect non-obvious associations or themes
which link dream scenes. Specifically, a peripheral association
in one scene may become dominant in the following scene
(Llewellyn, 2013), and the continuity may have an emotional
basis (Nielsen, 2013).
In the next section I use a dream to illustrate (a) how pattern
identification amongst dream memory elements may enable
prospective coding and also, sometimes, fuse associated memory
elements (b) how vagueness in dreams may be engendered by
pruning redundancy and (c) how apparent scene discontinuities
may result from transitions between image-based codes which
are connected by an underlying emotional theme.
The illustrative dream was collected in the home and recorded
in a dream diary. There are no claims that it is typical in any
way. It is self-identified as a REM dream because it conforms
more to REM dream characteristics than NREM. Distinctions
between REM and NREM dreams are debated and differences
may resemble a continuum rather than reflect discrete binary
oppositions. Nevertheless, REM dreams have been found to be
more story-like, hyperassociative and bizarre, spatially defined,
animated, characterized by vivid internal imagery, driven by
primary emotions (such as fear, anxiety, and elation) and typified
by more threatening interactions than NREM dreams, which are
shorter, more literal, and thought-like, perseverative, verbal, and
feature more friendly interactions (Lavie et al., 1984; Foulkes
et al., 1989; Cavallero et al., 1990; Stickgold et al., 1994; Nielsen,
1999, 2000; Nielsen et al., 2001; Hobson, 2002; Fosse et al., 2004;
McNamara et al., 2005; Desseilles et al., 2011).
ILLUSTRATIVE DREAM – “BAGPUSS”
The analysis of this dream encompassed two related processes:
memory sources were identified and patterns in remembered past
events were isolated.
The memory sources of dreams are, often, non-obvious
(Nielsen and Stenstrom, 2005). Dream reports are also open
systems, being always potentially open to additional or new
interpretations. In consequence, a hermeneutic approach was
used to identify memory sources and patterns for “Bagpuss.”
Hermeneutic inquiry is a textual method (where the “text” can
be a remembered event) for open systems which is appropriate
when associations are not readily apparent and, therefore, have
to be recovered through iterative processes of projection and
modification (Ricoeur, 1974, 1981).
For a dream report, it is not possible to “falsify” (Popper,
1959) an identified memory source or pattern. Additionally, the
hermeneutics of recovery do not seek to identify the “world
behind the text” or the hidden intention, desire or fear of the
(dream) author but the “world in front of the text”—which
are phenomena (associations, patterns in past events) of which
the author could be aware but the construction of the text
has obscured (Bauman, 2010). When the text is a dream (or
dream report), Bauman’s ideas imply that the dreamer has not
intentionally disguised the memory sources of the dream (cf.
Freud) but the hyperassociative and decontextualizing process of
dream construction has masked the memories which constitute
the dream.
The hermeneutic process of recovery is essentially
reconstructive. Reconstruction characterizes memory recall
which shares the same neural networks as imagining the future
and navigating, see, for example (Bartlett, 1932; Schachtel, 1947;
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007;
Schacter and Addis, 2007). As discussed earlier, dream analysis
gives rise to “Aha!” experiences both in relation to memory
sources and associative patterns in the content (Edwards
et al., 2013). “Aha!” moments occurred during the analysis of
“Bagpuss” and were experienced as insights into memory sources
or patterns but, as discussed here, insights cannot be taken as
definitive.
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“Bagpuss”
Date: July, 2009
Scene 1
I am waiting with PB in the Eye Hospital. I’m in the main
part of the hospital but I am (kind of) aware that I have to go
somewhere else. I tell a nurse that I can’t see properly, that my
vision isn’t right. She says that I have to see someone in the other
building. I am anxious about getting there and getting lost.
Scene 2
I am in another building and walking toward some carpeted
steps. Someone (a man?) is close behind me, is he helping me
or threatening me in some way? I am getting anxious again. He
is gray-haired. I think he is East European, maybe he is a Pole?
Also he may be the ophthalmologist.
Scene 3
I am sitting at a desk. The ophthalmologist is testing my eyes.
He produces a saggy, stripy cat- a kind of large, soft toy. But I
can’t see properly what it is. I have to identify some black signs
(like the letters on an eye chart but they may not be letters)
that are under the cat’s skin. I can’t see them properly. So the
ophthalmologist pushes the toy cat closer to show me. I know
that I have failed the eye test. I feel very anxious.
The Possible Associated Source Memories
for “Bagpuss”
In July 2009 a few evenings previous to the Bagpuss dream I
went out to dinner with my partner and D, his brother. D was
talking about walking in the countryside with his “pole.” I felt
confused and had to ask for clarification because, prior to this
conversation I had never heard of a walking stick being called
a “pole.” For some reason, the “pole” discussion which ensued
caught my imagination.
About 2 weeks prior to this dream I went to the Eye Hospital
to have a test for glaucoma. I was very anxious about this test.
Glaucoma results in loss of peripheral vision and is common in
the elderly. I usually get my eyes tested at the local optometrist.
This was the first time I had been back to the Eye Hospital since I
was a child. The visit made me feel old. I went to the building
that I used to visit as a child but, on approaching the steps,
realized that this old building (although still having the sign “Eye
Hospital”) was actually closed down. The new Eye Hospital was
around the corner but I was uncertain exactly where. Scene 1
reflects this- in the sense that in waking I went to the wrong
building. In the dream, however, I am in the original Eye Hospital
building and see a nurse. PB did not go with me to the Eye
Hospital either as a child or an adult. I worked with PB, however,
in the Main Hospital—which adjoins the old Eye Hospital when
we were both young women.
The steps I approach in Scene 2 could reflect the ones at the
entrance to the old Eye Hospital. The positioning of the gray-
haired man and me in Scene 2 resembles the sign used in the
UK to indicate that elderly people may be crossing the road
(an old man leaning on a walking stick with a bent old woman
immediately behind him; Figure 1).
FIGURE 1 | Sign used in the UK to indicate that elderly people may be
crossing the road.
In the dream, the gray-haired man is behind me. Indeed in wake
I had misremembered this aspect of the sign because on seeing it
on the internet I surprised that the woman is behind rather than
in front of the man. The East European (Pole) reference may be a
memory of East European immigration which (at the time) was a
political issue in the UK.
In Scene 3 the action resembles memories of many of the
eye tests I have undergone in the sense that there is an ocular
specialist, a means of eye testing and me.
Pattern Identification Amongst Memories
May Enable Prospective Coding and, as a
Result, Engender Bizarreness
As discussed above, Scene 1 may portray associations amongst
my recent appointment at the Eye Hospital with the ones I had as
a child where I did enter, wait and then see a nurse. As discussed
above, prospective coding must rely on discerning patterns in
the world. The pattern, here, may be “not being able to see”
accompanied by anxiety. As a child I had to remove my glasses to
have my eyes tested whereas as an adult I take out contact lenses
but in both cases because I am so short-sighted it engenders
anxiety about moving around. Another possible related pattern
is “fear of blindness.” As a child, I wore glasses from the age of
five. I used to fear that the increasingly strong spectacles I was
prescribed indicated I may go blind. As an adult I am being tested
for glaucoma which can cause blindness.
In Scene 2 the non-obvious pattern appears to be “pole” or
“Pole.” Various associations to “pole” may be distinguished in
this scene. Blind people, like the elderly, need sticks or “poles”
to walk. The gray-haired man behind me who is helping me to
walk (or may be threatening in some way) may reflect the elderly
man in the road sign using a walking stick or “pole.” One of
my former colleagues, who specialized in geriatrics, very much
disliked this sign. She said that it stigmatized older people as bent
and incapable and also looked as if one was a pickpocket- in that
it portrayed the couple as though one was taking money from
the other, this association may explain why, in the dream, I am
uncertain if the man is helping or threatening. At the time of the
dream, many UK nationals thought Poles were a threat to “their”
jobs and were, therefore, taking money from them. This issue was
much discussed on the news.
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In Scene 3 the non-obvious pattern may be “loss of peripheral
vision.” The eye chart is fused with a soft, cat toy creating a bizarre
image. “Bagpuss” is a 1970s children’s television character: an old,
pink striped, saggy cloth cat. Bagpuss is always shown in scenes
that fade out into hazy, blankness (see, Bagpuss on youtube,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpwhohWhrEE). Glaucoma
involves a loss of peripheral vision. Therefore, in the sense of
an image-based code for visual field restriction, Bagpuss is a
non-obvious association with glaucoma. To me, Bagpuss and
glaucoma bothmean visual field restriction.
Vagueness in Dreams may be Engendered
by Pruning Redundancy
In “Bagpuss” vagueness, or ambiguity, is most apparent in
Scene 2. In terms of reducing model complexity and pruning
redundancy (Hobson and Friston, 2012; Hobson et al., 2014),
prospective coding in sleep may induce fusion (as described
above) and vagueness because both would reduce the complexity
of the visual image, which, in turn, would facilitate rapid
deployment in wake. Complexity is reduced through pruning
detail from the memories involved- whenever this detail is
not required for the associations which are being portrayed in
the dream. In this sense, “pruning” is analogous to memory
condensation through association, noted by Freud. In Scene 2
there are three ambiguities: the man is behind me and, therefore,
not visible and yet I next note his gray hair, implying I have seen
him; his intentions are unclear- is he assisting me or menacing
in some way: and his identity is ambiguous, is he a “Pole” or
the ophthalmologist or is he a Polish ophthalmologist. And yet,
from the perspective of associational meaning, the image is,
arguably, unambiguous. It portrays my associations to “poles/
Poles.”
Scene Discontinuities may Mark
Transitions to a New Image-Based
Prospective Code but have an Underlying
Emotional Theme
Bagpuss has a story-like progression. I am looking for a place in
the Eye Hospital in Scene 1, in Scene 2 I may be approaching that
place and in Scene 3 my eyes are being tested. Nevertheless, there
is discontinuity in the sense of the abrupt transitions between
scenes. As discussed earlier, Andrillon et al. (2015) found that
REMs, like saccades in wake, signify transitions in image-based
or visual processing. Therefore, REMs may generate new dream
scenes which may constitute linked, prospective image-based
codes. All three scenes may be occurring at the Eye Hospital
which, for me, may be an emotionally-charged “landmark” place
(see below). The emotive theme of “vision loss or failure” also
links the three scenes. This is less apparent in Scene 2 than the
other two scenes, albeit there is a reference to an ophthalmologist.
However, Scene 2 is concerned with “poles” which are needed by
the blind or the elderly to move about. And the “Pole” appears
to be linked to “poles” through the associated pickpocket threat
(as perceived by my former colleague) in the “elderly people
crossing” sign and the perception held by someUKNationals that
“Poles” are taking “their” jobs and, therefore, “their” money.
Summary of Prospective Coding during
REM Sleep and Dreaming
Through discerning patterns inherent in prior experiences
(and knowledge), REM dreaming may portray the associations
between the memory elements which make up the pattern.
These associations may constitute new memory content. During
REM sleep, Landmann et al. (2015) report that memory
“reorganization” results in novel (i.e., new) memory content
which was not encoded directly during wake. This new
associational memory content may enable predictions though
constituting image-based prospective codes which can mobilized
as predictive codes during wake.
A self-organizing brain may both engender and identify
meaning through making associations. As argued earlier,
meaning is often idiosyncratic to the individual, being derived
from prior experiences (and knowledge) and the individual’s
needs, desires, and goals—all of which may be opaque- even to
those intimate with them. For this reason, the dreamer should
have privileged insight into meaningful dream associations,
which is not equivalent to asserting that the dreamer is necessarily
correct. Hill et al. (1993) found interpreting one’s own dream
engendered more insight than interpreting that of another
person, see also Edwards et al. (2013) and Edwards et al. (2015)
for dream insight studies.
In psychology the term “elaborative encoding” designates
the process of discerning meaning in past events and the
binding together of meaningfully associated elements of past
experience to enable inferences to be drawn (Craik and
Tulving, 1975; Tulving, 1983; Craik, 2002). Llewellyn (2013)
argues that REM dreaming is elaborative encoding during
sleep. This may be another way of contending that REM
dreaming constitutes prospective coding because elaborative
encoding enables inferences which, in turn, generate predictions.
Indeed, to “encode” may imply generating the meaningful
associations which constitute a “code.” Theta oscillations occur
during associative mnemonic processes (Miller, 1989, 1991),
concomitantly, theta is essential to encoding (Buzsáki, 2002;
Vertes, 2005). A theta-gamma code underlies the associative
encoding of multiple items or events and their contexts (Lisman,
2005; Lisman and Buzsáki, 2008; Tort et al., 2009; Lisman and
Jensen, 2013). Theta-gamma coordination is present during both
wake and REM sleep (Montgomery et al., 2008), indicating that
encodingmay characterize both states, but encoding during REM
sleep may be more elaborate (Hutchison and Rathore, 2015) in
the sense of the associations created during REM being non-
obvious or “looser.”
In evolutionary terms, the creative, non-obvious associations
forged in REM dreaming may serve to complement the more
obvious, tight associations made in wake (Stickgold et al., 1999).
As argued earlier, Wallas (1926) pointed out the evolutionary
imperative to recognize “resemblance in difference.” Bagpuss and
glaucoma are very different but they are both characterized by
visual field restriction. Contemporarily, loss of peripheral vision
is a frightening prospect but does not jeopardize my survival.
In evolutionary terms, however, such vision loss would have
been life-threatening. During REM dreaming when prefrontal
regions are deactivated, cognitive control is attenuated which
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may enable the identification of non-obvious associations (see
earlier). Hence, this threat of vision loss may have generated an
inclusive search for any “resemblance in difference” associations.
Any previous experiences with visual field restriction could
constitute part of a meaningful pattern which could possibly
assist in coping with the threat.
A related way of explaining the identification of loose
associations in REM dreaming is that non-obvious or “bizarre,”
personally meaningful, visual associations are mnemonic i.e.,
they aid memory retention and retrieval (Luria, 1968; Groninger,
1971; Roediger, 1980; McDaniel and Einstein, 1986; Einstein
and McDaniel, 1987; Wilding and Valentine, 1997; Wang and
Thomas, 2000; Worthen and Hunt, 2011; Llewellyn, 2013).
OFF-LINE STATES AND PROSPECTIVE
CODING
As discussed above, during off-line states, people review the
past to predict the future (Bar, 2007, 2011; Schütz-Bosbach and
Prinz, 2007). Such reviews of the past may assume somewhat
dissimilar forms in different off-line states. As discussed above,
the off-line state of REM dreaming may engender a prospective
code which results from the identification of an associative,
non-obvious probabilistic pattern in events, for example, the
associative pattern amongst “waterhole” and “abundance of prey”
and “presence of a predator.” Off-line states also occur during
wake, when, rather than perception of the immediate sensory
environment, brain processing turns to cogitation on the past
and future. For example, the off-line “default mode” (Binder
et al., 1999; Raichle et al., 2001) shows overlap with brain regions
activated during the associative processing which may generate
predictions (Bar et al., 2007). Brain processing during wake,
however, is more attuned to tighter, more logical associations
than the looser, non-obvious associations discerned during REM
sleep (Stickgold et al., 1999). In turn, this may imply that the
patterns identified during wake are more strongly determined by
regular co-occurrences or tight sequences of events. Therefore,
prospective coding during wake may take a different form as
compared to prospective coding during REM dreaming- albeit
that these different forms may constitute more of a continuum
than a dichotomy. Different forms of prospective coding may
relate to the ecological context within which prospective coding
may have evolved.
Before discussing- in some detail- the possible ecological
context for the evolution of different forms of prospective coding,
it is worth noting that formal or computational approaches speak
to the evolutionary significance of prospective coding. There
is a body of work that shows prospective coding is necessary
for planning and inference, demonstrated most clearly in the
context of Markov decision processes—as a model for planning
and choice behavior, see Friston et al. (2015). Crucially, this work
indicates that prospective coding enables agents to interrogate
affordances (see earlier) to select actions or plans with the greatest
epistemic or pragmatic utility. In other words, prospective coding
is necessary to both derive knowledge from the environment
and obtain pragmatic rewards, which has obvious evolutionary
imperatives.
The Ecological Context for Prospective
Coding?
We live on a patchwork planet (MacDonald and Johnson,
2015). Natural resources, including food and water, are clumped
rather than evenly or randomly dispersed, consuming food from
clumped areas requires retained knowledge of their locations
(“place memory”), indeed, patchy resource consumption may
have driven the evolution of spatial memory (Cunningham and
Janson, 2013).
Few animals are nomadic (Powell, 2000). Nearly all occupy
confined, fairly stable habitats for a season, a year or even a
lifetime, this regularly exploited territory is the ‘home range’
(Burt, 1943), a concept which originates with Darwin (Börger
et al., 2008). Within the home range, animals will tend to return
to resource-rich locations (i.e., ones with food, water, refuge or
mates) whilst trying to avoid places where they have encountered
aggression or danger, for review, see Stamps andKrishnan (1999).
Such strategies increase fitness through exploiting resources
efficiently and avoiding risk (Spencer, 2012).
In consequence, for any animal (or early human), there would
have been key landmark places which were used regularly, for
example, dependable food sources and refuges from predators
(Kaufmann, 1962; Samuel et al., 1985; Benhamou and Riotte-
Lambert, 2012). In natural environments, animals still make
tours, sometimes daily, between a series of such resource-rich
places, where they spend time, followed by a straight return to the
home base, indicating memory for what-where place associations
and the use of landmark navigation- at least of a rudimentary
kind (Janzen, 1971; Gallistel, 1990;Wallace et al., 2006; Noser and
Byrne, 2007, 2010).
In such an ecological context, two forms of prospective
coding may have evolved, prospective coding which required
probabilistic, non-obvious associations amongst prior
events at the landmark places and prospective coding of
the sequences which constituted the pathways or journeys
between the landmark places, see Llewellyn and Hobson
(2015). The visual sequences along regularly used pathways
or frequently undertaken journeys would, in all likelihood, be
more characterized by a tighter associational status than the
discontiguous events (e.g., sightings of predators at different
times) at the landmark place.
Prospective Coding of Landmark Places
and REM Dreaming
Landmark places are characterized by spatially clumped resource
availability which attracts many animals and is associated with
increased aggressive behavior, for review, see Robb and Grant
(1998). For example, animals which drink water must make
regular visits to waterholes, rendering them “landscapes of
fear” (Willems and Hill, 2009; Hayward and Hayward, 2012)
because both prey and predators congregate there (Burger, 2001)
and predators often hunt their prey in the vicinity of water
(Meer et al., 2012). As mentioned earlier, male lions are “sit
and wait” predators, they take advantage of long vegetation
around waterholes to ambush prey (Hopcraft et al., 2005; Valeix
et al., 2009, 2010). Similarly, snakes select their ambush sites
at oases < 5m from the water (Tsairi and Bouskila, 2004). At
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waterholes, elephants intimidate, aggressively chase and passively
interfere with others present (Valeix et al., 2007). For an animal
(or early human) on approach to a waterhole, predicting the
cumulative patterned place-reward-danger associations of this
landmark would enable appropriate action with respect to
risk. If there is only one waterhole available to the animal, it
cannot always avoid visiting for fear of predators or aggressive
competitors.
On any tour, the animal’s approach to a landmark is the
most dangerous time (Valeix et al., 2009; Périquet et al., 2010).
Congruent with dreaming associating experiences which, in
evolutionary time, occurred on approach to a regularly visited
landmark place, in a study (not distinguishing between REM
and non-REM) 73% of dreams portrayed approach behaviors
(Malcolm-Smith et al., 2012). Perogamvros et al. (2013) stated
that dreams prioritize significant phenomena which have a high
value for survival. The self (the dreamer) features in 95% of REM
dreams (Snyder, 1970),McCarley andHoffman (1981) found that
79% of REMdreams are characterized bymovement of the lower-
extremities, as would be required for spatial navigation. Typical
themes in dream reports may reflect evolutionary “landmark”
origins, for example, two studies (not distinguishing between
REM and non-REM) reported “being chased or pursued,”
“falling,” and “a person now alive as dead” occurring in 92.2,
87.1, and 75.0% of one student sample and 94.6, 76.8, and
69.6% of another (Yu, 2008, 2011). Anxious uncertainty about
outcomes is common in dreams (Schwartz, 2012). Dream reports
encompass more social interactions than wake reports and REM
dreams portray more aggressive interactions than non-REM, the
difference was threefold (McNamara et al., 2005). As discussed
above, landmark places, such as waterholes, would be “social,”
interactive places because they attract mates and competitors but
would also harbor threat causing anxious uncertainty because of
the predation risk.
Prospective coding of probabilistic events at a landmark
place would have survival value. Anticipation would increase
the chances of the animal obtaining rewards (e.g., food, water,
and mating), whilst avoiding aggression (Valeix et al., 2009). As
noted earlier, the imperative to make tours to consume resources
at landmark places may have driven the evolution of spatial
memory networks (Cunningham and Janson, 2013). Indeed, the
basic spatial network characteristic of pathways which meet at
omnidirectional landmark junctions may be conserved in human
brain networks (Burgess et al., 2002; Llewellyn, 2013; Llewellyn
and Hobson, 2015). At an omnidirectional landmark junction,
individual pathways are superimposed and, therefore, associated
(O’Keefe and Burgess, 1996) in both world and mental space.
An omnidirectional junction is comprised of neurons which
collectively express its meaning or significance (Buzsáki, 2005).
In evolutionary terms, this associative meaning may have had
concrete significance for the needs, desires and goals (Clore and
Ortony, 2000) of an animal on approach to a landmark junction.
REM dreaming may engender a prospective image-based code
of any meaningful, associative, probabilistic, experiential pattern
in past events at a landmark. On approach to the landmark in
wake, in the context of sensory input which could be indicative
of threat, this prospective code could be mobilized rapidly
and unconsciously as a predictive code to decide whether to
continue to approach or to retreat. Prospective coding may also
be undertaken for the pathways which link the landmarks, this
will, briefly, be considered next.
Prospective Coding of Sequences during
Wake
In contrast to prospective coding during REM dreaming, which
may associate and encode “temporally discontiguous events”
(Rawlins, 1985; Buzsáki, 1996) to engender an omnidirectional
landmark junction, prospective coding during off-line states
during wake may encode spatiotemporally ordered sequences
which, across evolutionary time, equated to the pathways,
journeys or trajectories which linked the landmark places. When
traveling along any previously experienced trajectory, sensory
data triggers memories of the upcoming places (Jensen and
Lisman, 1996) through hippocampal forward “sweeps” (Johnson
and Redish, 2007; Lisman and Redish, 2009). This form of
prospective coding may rely on tighter, more deterministic,
associations than that undertaken in REM dreaming.
Prospective Coding during NREM Sleep
and Dreaming
This paper offers a hypothesis: REM dreaming is one form of
prospective coding which evolved from identifying a loose or
non-obvious associative pattern in personally significant events
at a frequently visited landmark place. Dreaming also occurs
during NREM sleep, however. Although, as discussed above,
NREM dreams are rather different, being, inter alia, shorter, less
hyperassociative, more literal, and thought-like.
It is suggested above that prospective coding during wake
may encode associative sequences, evolving from the encoding
of the pathways which linked the omnidirectional landmark
places. However, the theory of cognitive mapping encompasses
landmark locations and their relationships to one another
(O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Maguire et al., 1999; Burgess et al.,
2002). Associations between the landmark places would be the
routes traveled and their relative directions. Prospective coding
during NREM dreams may have evolved from encoding these
associations.
There would also have been an imperative to encode
associations between what could be found at different landmark
places. For example, if there were two waterholes within reach
of the animal these would be associated because water was
afforded at both. Computer simulation produces cognitive maps
encompassing both object-scene and scene-scene associations
(Sato and Yamaguchi, 2005). Object-scene-scene associations
(such as water at two different waterholes) may be encoded
during REMdreams but directional scene-scene associationsmay
be encoded during NREM.
Testing the Hypothesis
The overall hypothesis is testable through observing the
consequences of brain lesions which obliterate dreaming- if,
indeed, such elimination occurs. For example, Solms (1997)
undertook a study of patients who reported loss of dreaming
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after either bilateral lesions of the ventromesial region or lesions
of the parieto-temporo-occipital junction. He observed that
these patients became “aspontaneous, inert and apathetic. . . [and]
showed a massive depletion in. . . libido (appetitive interest)”
(Solms and Turnbull, 2002). Such depletion in drive and energy
would be expected from a loss in the ability to derive those
patterns in past events which enable the anticipation of the future.
In turn, loss of the ability to anticipate, indeed, to enact the
future (Varela et al., 1991; Di Paolo, 2009) would engender loss
of meaning and abolish willed action. A critique of such studies,
however, is that patients with such lesions may have lost the
ability to remember dreams rather ceased dreaming. Replication
is required to address this and extend Solm’s findings on the loss
of appetitive interest.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Prime facie, “dream to predict” sounds implausible, not least
because the bizarre events in dreams never materialize in the
wake state. But if prediction involves prospective codes which
fuse phenomena with the same meaning, given a particular
context, and render other phenomena vague, if they are not
essential to that context, one can entertain a role for REM
dreaming in prospective coding. Dream bizarreness may be an
aspect of the prospective coding process rather than a concrete
signal of things to come. A prospective code, generated in
REM dreaming, may identify a personally salient, non-obvious
probabilistic pattern in past events and portray that pattern
in an unconscious, sensorimotor image which, if mobilized
as a predictive code in wake, supports cognition in wake
through rapidly co-ordinating sensory input with appropriate
action. The form taken by any prospective code may also
relate to the ecological context for the predictive brain, where
REM dreaming evolved to engender an image-based code
which hyperassociates temporally discontiguous events at what
was, in evolutionary terms, a frequently visited landmark
place.
Dreams are odd but as Dobzhansky (1973) remarked
“Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of
evolution.”
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